Data for: Social preferences and voting on reform: An experimental study

Abstract of associated article: Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.

关联论文摘要：围绕提升效率却加剧不平等的改革进行辩论，是民主制度的常规议事议题。费尔南德斯与罗德里克（Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991）指出，反改革偏见的根源在于个体对改革引发的损益分配存在个体特异性的不确定性。本文通过实验证实，由不确定性催生的反改革偏见可通过社会偏好得以缓解。研究发现，矛盾的是，诸多本将因改革蒙受损失的个体，因重视效率而投出赞成票；而诸多本有望从改革中获益的个体，却因不平等厌恶而反对改革。