Replication Data for: Tariff Evasion and Trade Policies

Governments use tariffs to manage the politics of international economic integration. To navigate competing demands on trade policy, governments can target tariff rates to individual products. But existing theories miss an important aspect of tariffs: they also need to be enforced at border crossings, which for some governments creates substantial challenges. Faced with high tariffs, firms can misclassify their products into categories with lower tariff rates. Pointing to the potential for such tariff evasion, I discuss the difficulties for governments in targeting tariffs for political gain, and I derive implications for trade politics. Constraints on the ability of governments to enforce tariffs, in the form of low bureaucratic capacity, emerge as an institutional determinant of trade policy, discouraging the use of product-specific tariff rates. Disaggregated tariff data provide empirical evidence for this argument. The article identifies an institutional constraint on trade politics, contributes to growing literatures on firm heterogeneity and on illicit cross-border economic activity, and speaks to debates on trade policy and government revenue.

各国政府借助关税工具，调控国际经济一体化进程中的政治博弈格局。为应对贸易政策领域相互掣肘的多元政策诉求，政府可针对单一产品设定差异化关税税率。但既有贸易理论忽略了关税实施的关键一环：关税需在边境口岸完成征管，而部分政府在此环节面临极大挑战。当面临高额关税时，企业可能会将产品错误归类至低税率税号类别，以此规避关税。鉴于此类关税规避行为的潜在风险，本文探讨了政府为获取政治收益而推行差异化关税所面临的诸多困境，并推导了该困境对贸易政治的影响。以行政能力不足为表现形式的关税征管能力约束，作为一项制度性因素成为贸易政策的重要决定因素，会抑制政府采用产品特异性关税税率。细分关税数据为本文的核心论点提供了实证支撑。本文明确了贸易政治面临的一项制度性约束，丰富了关于企业异质性（firm heterogeneity）与跨境非法经济活动的研究脉络，并为贸易政策与政府税收相关的学术讨论提供了新的解读视角。