Replication Data for Schmuck, David and Hohendorf, Lukas (2023) \"Loyal lists, distinctive districts: how dissent-shirking and leisure-shirking affect mixed-candidate selection\"

In parliamentary systems, party leaderships accomplish party unity by promising positive incentives to their members of parliament (MP) and threatening them with negative incentives. Regarding reselection, ‘loyal’ and active MPs should be rewarded with promising list positions, while rebellious and ‘slacking’ MPs should be punished with worse list positions or even denied renomination. Although this assumption is central to explaining party unity induced by party discipline, empirical evidence for this practice has been scarce. The study combines data on roll-call voting, parliamentary speeches and questions in the German Bundestag from 1990 to 2017 with novel data on renominations including renomination failures. Investigating list position changes and renomination failures in the German mixed-member system, the results indicate that selectorates of list candidates punished dissenting voting behaviour, while selectorates of district candidates considered the degree of parliamentary activity. The findings have broader implications for the representatives’ accountability in parliamentary systems.

在议会制体系下，政党领导层通过向议员（Member of Parliament，以下简称MP）许诺正向激励，并以负向激励相威胁，以此维系政党团结。关于连任遴选，对党忠诚且履职积极的MP应获得靠前的参选名单位次作为奖励，而持叛逆态度且懈怠懒散的MP则会被处以名单位次靠后的处罚，甚至被剥夺连任提名资格。尽管这一假设是解释政党纪律所催生的政党团结的核心逻辑，但针对该实践的实证研究证据却十分匮乏。本研究将1990年至2017年德国联邦议院（Bundestag）的唱名表决、议会发言与质询数据，与包含连任提名失败案例的连任提名全新数据集相结合。通过对德国混合选举制下的参选名单位次变动与连任提名失败案例展开分析，研究结果显示：名单候选人的提名遴选机构会对背离本党立场的表决行为予以惩戒，而选区候选人的提名遴选机构则会考量议员的议会履职活跃度。该研究发现对议会制体系下议员的问责机制具有更广泛的借鉴意义。