The leveraging effect of cost to benefit ratios on cooperation and punishment.

Varying k with g = 3 and varying q with p = 1. Cells give mean (± s.e.m.) cooperation (first figure) and punishment (second figure), each computed for generations 1001–2000 and averaged across 10 simulations. The area below the stepped line represents the condition pqb/c (where c = i -ki/g and b = ki/g).固定参数g=3以调整参数k，固定参数p=1以调整参数q。各表格单元格中的数值为合作水平（第一幅子图）与惩罚水平（第二幅子图）的均值（±标准误，standard error of the mean，缩写s.e.m.）；两类指标均基于第1001至2000代的数据计算得到，并在10次模拟实验中取平均。阶梯线下方的区域对应条件式pqb/c（其中c = i - ki/g，b = ki/g）。