Replication Data for: \"Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective\"

Do electorates hold governments accountable for the distribution of economic welfare? Building on the finding of “class-biased economic voting” in the United States, we examine how OECD electorates respond to alternative distributions of income gains and losses. Drawing on individual-level electoral data and aggregate election results across 15 advanced democracies, we examine whether lower- and middle-income voters defend their distributive interests by punishing governments for concentrating income gains among the rich. We find no indication that non-rich voters punish rising inequality, and substantial evidence that electorates positively reward the concentration of aggregate income growth at the top. Our results suggest that governments commonly face political incentives systematically skewed in favor of inegalitarian economic outcomes. At the same time, we find that the electorate’s tolerance of rising inequality has its limits: class biases in economic voting diminish as the income shares of the rich grow in magnitude.

选民是否会因经济福利分配问题而追究政府责任？基于美国「阶级偏向型经济投票」的研究发现，我们探讨了经合组织（OECD）成员国的选民群体如何应对不同的收入得失分配格局。我们借助15个发达民主国家的个体层面选举数据与整体选举结果，探究中低收入选民是否会通过惩罚将收入增益集中于富人群体的政府，以维护自身的分配利益。我们未发现任何证据表明非富人选民会因不平等程度加剧而惩罚政府，却获得充分证据显示，选民群体对顶层群体集中总收入增长的行为会给予正向嘉奖。我们的研究结果表明，各国政府普遍面临系统性偏向于催生不平等经济结果的政治激励。与此同时，我们发现选民对不平等加剧的容忍度存在边界：随着富人收入占比不断扩大，经济投票中的阶级偏向会随之减弱。