Replication Data for: Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana

In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians' behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N=864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians' corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.

从理论层面而言，赋予政客监督官僚的手段可减少行政渎职行为。与之相对，本文提出不同观点：当政客需要筹措资金用于竞选活动且面临有限的制度约束时，对官僚的政治管控反而会加剧腐败。在此类情境下，政客可利用自身自由裁量权，诱导官僚为其从国家中攫取租金。本文基于针对加纳80个随机抽样地方政府的官僚开展的原创调研数据（样本量N=864），研究发现：当政客被认为拥有更高水平的自由裁量控制权时，官僚更有可能协助政客实施腐败行为。本文借助定性数据与列表实验阐释了其作用机制，证实政客会通过威胁调离不服从的官员来实施腐败行为。本研究为发展中国家公共行政缺陷的成因提供了全新实证证据，并修正了“更强的政治监督可优化治理”这一预设。