Results from the moderating effect.

This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation schemes and ESG greenwashing behavior in Chinese listed firms during the period 2013–2022. We find that a CEO’s cash (equity) compensation has a significantly positive (negative) correlation with corporate ESG greenwashing behavior. From mechanism analysis, consistent with the agency problem view, firms engage in more severe ESG greenwashing behavior under a higher proportion of cash in the CEO compensation structure. Such distortion behavior is mitigated by higher internal control quality in firms having an equity incentive for their CEO under the convergence of interest viewpoint. Additional analysis reveals that corporates audited by large accounting firms and those with more media coverage exacerbate the positive correlation between CEO cash compensation and ESG greenwashing behavior, while government environmental regulations reinforce the inhibitory effect of CEO equity compensation on ESG greenwashing. Our results imply that different CEO compensation schemes can have opposite effects on limiting firms’ ESG greenwashing behavior in the Chinese context. Furthermore, we highlight that the question of form over substance principle to certain external governance mechanisms, leading CEO to exacerbate impression management of ESG disclosure.本研究考察2013至2022年中国上市公司首席执行官（Chief Executive Officer, CEO）薪酬契约与ESG（环境、社会和公司治理，Environmental, Social and Governance）漂绿行为之间的关联。研究发现，CEO的现金（股权）薪酬与企业ESG漂绿行为呈显著正（负）相关关系。机制分析表明，契合代理问题视角，当CEO薪酬结构中现金占比越高时，企业的ESG漂绿行为愈发严重；基于利益趋同视角，当企业为CEO实施股权激励时，更高的内部控制质量可缓解此类失真行为。拓展性分析显示，由大型会计师事务所审计以及媒体关注度更高的企业，会强化CEO现金薪酬与ESG漂绿行为之间的正相关关系；而政府环境规制则会增强CEO股权薪酬对ESG漂绿行为的抑制效应。本研究结果表明，在中国情境下，不同的CEO薪酬契约对抑制企业ESG漂绿行为可产生截然相反的作用效果。此外，本研究还指出，部分外部治理机制存在形式重于实质的问题，这会促使CEO加剧对ESG信息披露的印象管理行为。