Impact of management models on revenue sharing for signaling medical equipment reliability

This paper examines the contracting problem between a medical equipment vendor and a hospital in the healthcare industry. Many medical treatments depend heavily on the reliability of newly developed equipment, which typically encompasses private information on the part of the vendor. We built a game-theoretic model to examine the optimal contract a vendor can offer to prevent hospitals from underpaying for a reliable machine. First, the contract format including revenue sharing may serve as a signaling device of reliability. Second, the management model of a hospital has a strong impact on contract design. In particular, the vendor is better able to signal its reliability through revenue sharing to a non-profit hospital than to a for-profit hospital. Lastly, revenue sharing becomes more attractive to vendors as hospitals are more concerned about social welfare.本文聚焦医疗行业中医用设备供应商与医院之间的契约设计问题。诸多临床诊疗高度依赖新型研发设备的可靠性，而此类设备的相关信息往往属于供应商的私有信息。本文构建博弈论模型，旨在分析供应商为避免医院对高可靠性设备出价过低而可提供的最优契约方案。其一，包含收益分成的契约形式可作为设备可靠性的信号传递手段；其二，医院的运营模式对契约设计具有显著影响，具体而言，相较于营利性医院，供应商通过收益分成向非营利性医院传递自身设备可靠性信号的效果更佳；最后，当医院越发关注社会福利时，收益分成模式对供应商的吸引力也随之提升。