Data for: Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers

Abstract of associated article: We study optimal incentive provision for “knowledge workers”, a crucial resource for many organizations. We augment a standard moral-hazard framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave; thereby harming their employer. Second, the value of the worker׳s outside option might depend on effort on the job. Optimal contracts that retain workers exhibit properties such as first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness to changes in underlying conditions. Due to large rents, full retention is, however, costly for employers. Hence, even when socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium.

关联论文摘要：我们针对知识型员工（knowledge workers）——众多组织的核心资源——展开最优激励机制设计研究。我们对标准道德风险框架进行拓展，以契合两类关键现实特征：其一，员工留存面临严峻挑战：员工可自由离职，进而损害雇主利益；其二，员工的外部选择权价值可能取决于其在职努力水平。能够实现员工留存的最优激励契约具备如下特征：要么达成第一优努力水平与总剩余，要么对基础环境变化无响应性。然而，由于存在高额租金，雇主实现完全员工留存的成本极高。因此，即便该结果存在社会无效率，均衡状态下仍可能出现雇佣分离的情形。