Notations of the Tripartite Evolutionary Game.

In the context of China’s road to rail policy, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to mathematically investigate the strategic interactions among local governments, railway transport enterprises, and shippers. By employing mathematical modeling and simulation analysis, we examine the dynamic evolution of each stakeholder’s strategy under varying conditions and verify the stability of the model. The findings indicate that government subsidies have a substantial effect on promoting shippers’ adoption of rail transport, although this effect weakens over time. Furthermore, improvements in service quality by railway enterprises can significantly increase the attractiveness of rail transport, with shippers demonstrating the capacity to swiftly adapt to changing market conditions. This research highlights that an initial phase of government subsidies, followed by their gradual withdrawal, can effectively facilitate the modal shift from road to rail by leveraging market mechanisms. This study provides theoretical insights and practical guidance for the formulation of effective transport policies, emphasizing the pivotal role of government incentives, the proactive engagement of railway enterprises, and the adaptive behavior of shippers in advancing sustainable freight transport.立足于我国公转铁政策背景下，本研究构建三方演化博弈模型，从数学层面探析地方政府、铁路运输企业与货主之间的战略互动关系。通过数学建模与仿真分析，本研究考察了不同情境下各利益相关方策略的动态演化过程，并验证了模型的稳定性。研究结果表明，政府补贴对推动货主选择铁路运输具有显著作用，但该作用会随时间推移逐渐减弱。此外，铁路运输企业提升服务质量可显著增强铁路运输的吸引力，而货主具备快速适配市场环境变化的能力。本研究指出，通过发挥市场机制作用，先实施阶段性政府补贴再逐步退出补贴，可有效推动公路运输向铁路运输的转型。本研究可为制定高效的运输政策提供理论参考与实践指引，强调了政府激励、铁路运输企业主动作为以及货主的适配行为在推动货运可持续发展中的关键作用。