Agents of Peace or Enablers of Violence? The Proximal Effects of Mediators in International Disputes

The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals' strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an ‘insurance policy’, reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995-2010. We find that in 42% of the conflicts, the arrival of the mediator was significantly associated with increased hostilities. We discuss this pattern and examine factors that might be linked to its occurrence.

国际关系学界的既有研究通常将调停者刻画为争端缓和的有效行动者，认为调停启动后，冲突双方理应降低对抗烈度并开启谈判进程。但本文主张，调停者的介入实则可能推动乃至加剧冲突升级，尤其是在调停启动后的初期阶段。冲突双方可能出于彰显自身决心的战略需求而激化对抗，而若其认为调停者会约束报复行为，则这种对抗烈度会进一步升级。就此而言，调停者会被双方视为一份“保险单”，既降低了其对冲突升级可能性的预判，也削弱了其对冲突升级潜在代价的感知。为探究这一现象，本文追踪了1995年至2010年间国内冲突中调停启动后六个月内冲突双方的行为模式。研究发现，在42%的样本冲突中，调停者的介入与对抗烈度的提升存在显著相关性。本文将对这一规律展开讨论，并分析可能与其出现相关的各类影响因素。