Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations

When and how can weak states increase their bargaining leverage in international organizations? I argue that during phases of routine bargaining, distributional outcomes depend on the states’ political and economic leverage and less on the formal allocation rules, so they are unfavorable to weak states. This changes in phases of extraordinary bargaining, which are occasioned by significant reform such as enlargement. States that expect distributional conflict from enlargement can threaten to block accession negotiations and increase their membership benefits even if they are politically weak. Statistical and qualitative analyses of distributional bargaining in the European Union support the theoretical claims.

弱势国家可通过何种路径、在何时提升其在国际组织中的议价能力？本文认为，在常规议价阶段，分配结果主要取决于各国的政治与经济实力，而非正式分配规则，因此这类结果对弱势国家并不利好。而在诸如扩员这类重大改革引发的非常规议价阶段，这一局面将发生改变：即便自身政治实力偏弱，预期扩员会引发分配冲突的国家，仍可通过威胁阻挠入盟谈判，来提升自身的成员国权益。针对欧洲联盟（European Union）内部分配议价问题开展的定量与定性分析，验证了本文的理论主张。