Replication data for: A Test of Resolve: Asymmetry and Brinkmanship in Nuclear Crises

We examine the effect of nuclear arsenal asymmetry on crisis outcomes and duration within nuclear dispute dyads. We identify and improve upon certain shortcomings in existing scholarship, to provide more rigorous confirmation of the positive relationship between nuclear asymmetry and favorable crisis outcomes in nuclear crisis dyads. We confirm said relationship but find inconclusive support for a mechanism of resolve, suggesting that the mechanism of nuclear crisis bargaining may be less parsimonious than previously suggested. We extend the crisis bargaining logic to nuclear crisis duration, finding that asymmetry in nuclear arsenal size and second strike capacity within nuclear states dispute dyads decreases the length of crises. This is consistent with the view that nuclear weapons confer bargaining advantages on states, and further suggest that crisis bargaining behavior is closely calibrated to the potential costs of nuclear escalation, with decision makers apparently able to recognize fine-grained differences in the costs of nuclear escalation within nuclear dyads.