Beyond the Deterrence Dilemma: A Game-Theoretic Deconstruction of NATO-Russia Nuclear Postures

Since the Cold War, the Ukrainian crisis has repeated itself. Although Trump’s attitude towards Russia has eased since he took office, this posture will not end the series of Ukrainian crises. In his recent dialogue with Zelensky, Trump called for the resumption of a key U.S.-Ukrainian mineral agreement, which is one of the multiple strategic intentions of the U.S. to aid Ukraine, while Russia’s strategic intention is to prevent NATO from continuing its eastward expansion. Both claim their demands are related to national security interests. The former consists of multiple short-term interests, while the latter depends on long-term strategic stability, which depends on several complex factors, and it is not easy to maintain foreign policy coherence in a country with a multi-party government such as the United States. The future resolution of the Ukrainian crisis will depend on the negotiation expectations between the United States and Russia. Based on complex deterrence theory and cognitive deterrence theory, this paper employs non-mathematical game theory to present the multiple rounds of dynamic mutual nuclear deterrence between NATO and Russia with a game tree and information transmission model, aiming at analysing the reasons for the change of NATO’s attitude towards the effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear deterrence in the context of the Ukrainian crisis.

自冷战以来，乌克兰危机反复上演。尽管特朗普就职后对俄罗斯的态度有所缓和，但这一姿态并未终结接连发生的乌克兰危机。在近期与泽连斯基的对话中，特朗普呼吁恢复美乌之间一项关键矿产协议，这也是美国援乌的多重战略意图之一；而俄罗斯的战略意图则是阻止北约（NATO）持续东扩。双方均声称自身诉求关乎国家安全利益：前者包含多重短期利益诉求，后者则关乎长期战略稳定，而这一稳定受诸多复杂因素影响；同时，在美国这样的多党制国家中，维持外交政策的连贯性并非易事。乌克兰危机的未来解决，将取决于美俄双方的谈判预期。本文基于复杂威慑理论与认知威慑理论，采用非数理博弈论方法，通过博弈树与信息传递模型，呈现北约与俄罗斯之间多轮动态相互核威慑的过程，旨在剖析乌克兰危机背景下，北约对俄罗斯核威慑有效性的态度转变原因。