Data for: Strike, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings

Abstract of associated article: We study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer. When the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action, we observe high levels of wages, effort choices, and total earnings. When the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage, trust and reciprocity drop dramatically due to widespread shirking. The stepwise introduction of two collective action mechanisms, strike and coordination, increases the employees׳ share of the total earnings, but does not mitigate the free-riding problem. Adding employment risk to the collective action setup drives up wages, reduces free-riding, and leads to higher total earnings. However, this increase in productivity is not sufficient to achieve the high levels of wages, efforts and earnings that we observe with individually differentiated wages.

关联论文摘要：本研究针对包含12名雇员与1名雇主的礼物交换博弈（gift exchange game）展开研究。当雇主可在无集体行动的场景中提供个性化差异化工资时，我们观测到较高的工资水平、努力程度选择与总收益。当雇主被限定仅能提供统一工资时，因普遍存在的偷懒行为，信任与互惠性均出现大幅下降。逐步引入罢工与协调两种集体行动机制后，雇员在总收益中的占比有所提升，但未能缓解搭便车问题。在集体行动框架中引入就业风险后，工资水平得以提升，搭便车行为减少，总收益也随之提高。然而，生产率的此番提升仍不足以达到我们在个体差异化工资场景下观测到的高工资、高努力程度与高收益水平。