Replication data for: Sweetening the Deal? Political Connections and Sugar Mills in India

Political control of firms is prevalent across the world. Evidence suggests that firms profit from political connections, and politicians derive benefit from control over firms. This paper investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from connected firms, examining sugar mills in India. I find evidence of embezzlement in politically controlled mills during election years, reflected in lower prices paid to farmers for cane. This result complements the literature on political cycles by demonstrating how campaign funds are raised rather than used. Politicians may recompense farmers upon getting elected, possibly explaining how they can get away with pilferage. (JEL D72, G34, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)

企业的政治控制在全球范围内普遍存在。已有研究证据显示，企业可通过政治关联实现盈利，而政客则可通过掌控企业获取自身利益。本文以印度制糖厂为研究对象，探讨了政客可借助关联企业在选举中获得选举收益的另一作用机制。本文研究发现，在选举年份，受政治控制的制糖厂存在公款侵占行为，具体体现为向甘蔗种植户支付的甘蔗收购价格偏低。本研究结论补充了现有政治周期相关文献，首次揭示了竞选资金的筹集而非使用路径。政客可在当选后对农户予以补偿，这或可解释此类侵占行为为何能够逃避监管追责。（JEL D72, G34, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13）