Data for: An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions

Abstract of associated article: To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond–Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks׳ liquidity levels are either linked or independent. Left Bank depositors see their bank׳s liquidity level before deciding. Right Bank depositors only see Left Bank withdrawals before deciding. We find that Left Bank depositors׳ actions significantly affect Right Bank depositors׳ behavior, even when liquidities are independent. Furthermore, a panic may be a one-way street: an increase in Left Bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the Right Bank, but a decrease does not calm depositors.

相关文章摘要：为了探究银行挤兑传染的机制，我们在修改后的Diamond-Dybvig框架下，对两家银行（左侧和右侧）进行了银行挤兑实验。银行的流动性水平要么相互关联，要么各自独立。左侧银行的储户在做出决定前会看到其银行的流动性水平。右侧银行的储户在做出决定前只能看到左侧银行的提款情况。我们发现，左侧银行储户的行为显著影响了右侧银行储户的行为，即便在流动性独立的情况下。此外，恐慌可能是一条单行道：左侧银行提款量的增加可能导致右侧银行发生恐慌性挤兑，但提款量的减少并不能平息储户的恐慌。