SatGrid Dataset, realtime genuine and spoofing traces of GPS signals collected at different geographical locations, times and environmental conditions

In order to spur the growth of GPS and ease its adoption by the private sector, all aspects of the design and implementation of the so-called L1 C/A (“Coarse Acquisition”) signal are made public. This openness along with lack of authentication has made it possible for a wide variety of attacks against GPS. Several defenses have been proposed to combat these attacks, but they are ultimately insufficient due to scope, expense, complexity, or robustness. With this in mind, we present our own solution: fingerprinting of GPS satellites. We assert that it is possible to create signatures, or fingerprints, of the satellites (more specifically their transmissions) that allow one to determine nearly instantly whether a received GPS transmission is authentic or not. We show that this solution detects all known spoofing attacks, that it does so while being fast, cheap, and simpler than previous solutions, and that it is highly robust with respect to environmental factors. The authors wish to thank Dr. Ramin Baseri, Mr. John Lee, and Mr. Andrew Lee of CACI and Drs. Jeffrey Reed and Robert W. McGwier of Virginia Tech for their guidance on, and support of, the work.为推动全球定位系统（Global Positioning System, GPS）的发展并降低其在私营部门的应用门槛，所谓L1 C/A（“粗捕获”）信号的设计与实现全流程均对外公开。这种公开性加之缺乏认证机制，使得针对GPS的各类攻击成为可能。目前已有多种防御方案被提出以抵御此类攻击，但受限于应用范围、部署成本、实现复杂度以及鲁棒性不足等问题，最终均无法达成预期效果。鉴此，我们提出自研解决方案——GPS卫星指纹识别技术。我们认为，可针对卫星（更确切地说，其下行信号传输）生成签名或指纹，借此可近乎瞬时判断接收到的GPS信号是否真实可靠。实验证明，该方案可检测所有已知的欺骗攻击，相较于既往防御方案，其兼具部署快速、成本低廉、实现简洁的优势，且对环境因素具备极强的鲁棒性。作者谨向CACI公司的拉明·巴塞里博士、约翰·李先生与安德鲁·李先生，以及弗吉尼亚理工大学的杰弗里·里德博士与罗伯特·W·麦克吉尔博士致以诚挚谢意，感谢他们为本研究提供的指导与支持。