Replication Data for: To war or not to war: Backing down after a fait accompli in Japan

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.