Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn

This article offers an explanation for the intensity of redistributive policies from Latin American leftist governments during the so-called 'left turn'. It challenges the idea that the recent radical leftist governments are the product of region-specific characteristics. Based on theoretical models that analyze the implications of inequality in democracies and the moderating effects of different economic and institutional structures, it argues instead that the left's redistributive policies were more intense in countries where capital mobility is low and there was no pro-elite legislative veto player. To evaluate this explanation, we offer original evidence from time-series -cross-section regression models of social spending, based on data from thirteen Latin American countries over the years 2003 to 2015. The results show partial support for the explanation: there is strong evidence that social spending decreased with the ideological distance between the president and the pro-elite veto player, but only weak evidence that capital mobility attenuated this effect.本文针对所谓"左翼转向（left turn）"时期拉美左翼政府的再分配政策（redistributive policies）强度展开阐释，对"近期激进左翼政府是区域特定特征产物"这一观点提出质疑。本文依托分析民主制度下不平等的影响效应，以及不同经济与制度结构的调节作用的理论模型，提出核心反论：在资本流动性较低且不存在亲精英立法否决者（pro-elite legislative veto player）的国家，左翼政府的再分配政策力度更强。为验证该阐释的合理性，本文基于2003至2015年13个拉美国家的面板数据，构建时间序列-截面回归模型（time-series-cross-section regression models），并提供原创实证证据以考察社会支出（social spending）水平。研究结果对该阐释提供了部分支持：存在强实证证据表明，总统与亲精英否决者之间的意识形态距离越大，社会支出水平越低；但仅存在弱实证证据表明资本流动性会弱化这一效应。