Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges

Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in office for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incentives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for inexperienced leaders of both democratic and authoritarian states. Over time, however, resistance may become domestically less costly, causing experienced leaders to be more likely to prefer resistance. Anticipating this response, potential challengers may be more likely to target inexperienced leaders. Because democracies generally have high rates of leadership turnover, they are tempting targets for international violence. Statistical analysis of crisis initiation between 1918 and 1992 confirms the perception that democracies are more likely to be targets of militarized challenges. Results are also consistent with the proposition that the relatively short tenure in office served by democratic leaders helps to account for the observed pattern of democratic attraction of foreign challenges.

即便实力雄厚、威慑力强劲的民主国家，也极易成为国际暴力的目标——这是因为平均而言，民主国家领导人的执政时长要短于独裁国家领导人。对于民主与威权国家中缺乏执政经验的领导人而言，国内政治激励因素可能令其选择对抗的成本远高于作出让步。但随着时间推移，选择对抗的国内成本会逐渐降低，使得拥有丰富执政经验的领导人更倾向于采取对抗举措。潜在挑战者若预判到这一执政者的行为倾向，便更可能将缺乏执政经验的领导人作为攻击目标。由于民主国家普遍存在较高的领导人换届率，因此它们更容易成为国际暴力的目标。对1918年至1992年间危机发起行为的统计分析证实了一项共识：民主国家更易成为军事化挑衅的目标。研究结果同时印证了一项理论命题：民主国家领导人相对较短的执政任期，正是导致民主国家更易遭遇外部挑衅这一现象的关键诱因。