Case analysis of the bargaining risk.

“Belt and Road” infrastructure projects frequently encounter bargaining risks. This study aims to explore the causes of bargaining behavior and investigate how to control bargaining behavior in projects. The study identifies the factors affecting bargaining risk and employs evolutionary game theory to examine the strategic decisions of Chinese contractors and host governments. The results show that lower negotiation and bargaining costs promote sustained cooperation in the negotiation process. When the value of the contract is substantial and the contractor receives less benefit from the contract than it claims from the host government, terminating the project is good for the contractor.“一带一路”基础设施项目常面临议价风险。本研究旨在探析议价行为的成因，并探究项目中议价行为的管控路径。研究识别了影响议价风险的各类因素，并运用演化博弈论剖析中国承包商与东道国政府的战略决策。结果显示，较低的谈判与议价成本可推动谈判过程中的持续合作。当合同标的额可观，且承包商从合同中获得的收益低于其向东道国政府主张的收益时，终止项目对承包商更为有利。