Replication Data for: After the Punctuation: Competition, Uncertainty, and Convergent State Policy Change

What happens after longstanding policies are overthrown in fierce political battles, events scholars refer to as punctuated equilibrium? Do these new policies remain static and unchanging until the next big punctuation, or do they continue to change in explainable and predictable ways? In this paper we develop a model of post-punctuation policy change grounded in theories of boundedly rational decision-making by policymakers. Uncertain about how well the new policy will perform, policymakers learn to rely on competing interest groups for information, or, under certain circumstances look to other political jurisdictions for cues on how their policies ought to be further refined. We test our predictions by studying changes in state charter school laws from 1996 to 2014. We find evidence of policy change, and even convergence, across states suggesting that policies after punctuation do change in ways explained as reactions to political pressures in an environment fraught with uncertainty.

当长期存续的政策在激烈的政治博弈中被推翻后——这一学术领域称之为间断均衡（punctuated equilibrium）的事件——会产生何种影响？这些新政策会维持静态不变，直至下一次重大间断事件发生，还是会以可解释、可预测的方式持续演进？本文基于政策制定者有限理性决策理论，构建了间断后政策变迁模型。鉴于政策制定者对新政策的实施效果存在不确定性，他们既会选择依赖竞争性利益集团获取信息，也可能在特定情境下参考其他政治管辖区的实践经验，以进一步优化自身政策。我们以1996年至2014年间美国各州特许学校法的变迁为研究样本，对理论预测展开实证检验。研究结果证实了政策变迁乃至跨州政策趋同的存在，表明间断后的政策确实会在充满不确定性的政治环境中，通过回应各类政治压力而发生可被解释的演变。