Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions

The Trust game is a laboratory-based study conducted as follows: First, before assigning the roles, all rules were explained to the participants. All participants received three nuevos soles, were paired randomly, and assigned either an A or a B. As pairings were announced, they could observe the identity of their partner but were separated immediately and hence had no opportunity to communicate. The A's then had the opportunity to pass to the B's zero, one, two, or three of their coins. If A passed zero coins, the game ended. If A passed more than zero coins, the game administrator matched the amount passed. Then, B could pass back any number of coins to A and the game ended. Given the finite end, and assuming no post-game consequences, the sub-game perfect equilibrium was for B to pass back nothing to A and hence for A to pass nothing to B. Public goods game: Each participant was given one coin. Privately, each individual then either gave the administrator back the coin or did not. If the administrator received 80 percent or more of the coins back, then everyone was given two coins . Outcomes collected: Number of coins given and returned in trust game, participation in public goods game. default rate on loans, drop-out due to default or discipline, and total voluntary savings.

本数据集包含两项基于实验室的博弈实验，具体流程如下：
1. 信任博弈（Trust Game）：
在分配角色前，实验人员会向所有参与者讲解全部规则。所有参与者均可获得3秘鲁新索尔（nuevos soles），随后将被随机配对，并分配为角色A或角色B。配对结果公布后，参与者可知晓其搭档的身份，但会立即被分隔开，无法进行任何交流。
角色A可选择向角色B转移0、1、2或3枚代币：若角色A未转移任何代币，博弈直接结束；若转移了非零数额的代币，实验管理员将匹配该转移数额。随后，角色B可向角色A返还任意数量的代币，博弈随即结束。
鉴于博弈存在明确终止条件，且假设博弈结束后无后续影响，子博弈完美均衡（sub-game perfect equilibrium）的理论预测为：角色B不会向角色A返还任何代币，因此角色A也不会向角色B转移任何代币。
2. 公共品博弈（Public Goods Game）：
每名参与者将获得1枚初始代币。随后，每位参与者需私下选择将该代币交还给实验管理员，或保留该代币。若实验管理员收回的代币总数达到初始发放总量的80%及以上，则所有参与者将额外获得2枚代币。
3. 收集的实验数据包括：
信任博弈中的代币转移与返还数量、公共品博弈的参与情况、贷款违约率、因违约或违规导致的退出人数，以及总自愿储蓄额。