Do Anti-Corruption Messages Improve Public Service Delivery? Insights from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Burundi

This paper explores the effects of anti-corruption sensitisation messages on bribe-taking and public service delivery. In a novel lab-in-the-field experiment in Burundi, 527 public servants were asked to allocate rationed vouchers between anonymous citizens; some of these citizens attempted to bribe the public servants to obtain more vouchers than entitled. Two groups of public servants were randomly exposed to similar short messages that called to either the idea of good governance or professional values of integrity. Public servants exposed to the professional identity message behaved in a more equitable manner than those not exposed to any message. We hypothesise that reflecting upon professional values increases moral costs and prompts fairer service delivery. Bribe-taking was not impacted by the messages and bribe-taking and service delivery appear to be distinct dimensions, correlated to different variables. The experiment provides new insights into the design of public service improvement and anti-corruption strategies.

本文探讨了反腐警示宣教信息对公职人员受贿行为与公共服务供给的影响。研究在布隆迪开展了一项创新性实地实验室实验（lab-in-the-field experiment），共招募527名公职人员，要求其向匿名公民分配配给券；部分公民试图向公职人员行贿，以获取超出应得额度的配给券。研究将公职人员随机分为两组，分别接触两类相似的简短宣教信息，分别唤起善治理念与廉洁职业操守。结果显示，接触廉洁职业操守相关宣教信息的公职人员，其行为相较于未接触任何宣教信息的公职人员更为公平公正。本文提出假说：对职业操守的反思会提升道德成本，进而推动更公平的公共服务供给。研究发现，此类宣教信息并未对受贿行为产生影响，且受贿行为与公共服务供给看似属于两个独立维度，与不同变量相关联。本实验为公共服务优化与反腐策略的设计提供了全新的研究视角。