Replication data for: Beyond Prices: The Drivers of Farmer Loan Default

Farmers in developing countries are highly vulnerable to exogenous ecological and financial shocks; as a result, policy makers and researchers have become increasingly interested in developing policies and tools that will improve financial outcomes for smallholder farmers. One such instrument is a price-indexed indemnity loan, which forgives the farmer 50% of his loan debt if crop prices fall below a pre-specified threshold. The popularity of this type of loan is grounded in the assumption that price volatility can reduce farmer revenue, which then causes the farmer to default. However, based on data from a randomized field experiment in rural Ghana, we examine whether this assumption is valid; specifically, we empirically investigate the factors that are associated with farmer default. We find preliminary evidence that default rates are more significantly associated with changes in crop quantity, and not crop price. In addition, our analysis suggests that the social context in which loans are offered may play a significant role in whether farmers default. Although we are unable to assert causality between these various factors, we argue that such associations are compelling, and deserve further investigation in future field experiments.发展中国家的农户极易受到外生生态与金融冲击的影响，因此政策制定者与研究者愈发关注能够改善小农户财务状况的政策与工具。此类工具之一便是价格指数化补偿贷款（price-indexed indemnity loan），若作物价格跌破预设阈值，该贷款可免除农户50%的贷款债务。该类贷款之所以广受青睐，源于一个核心假设：价格波动会压低农户收入，进而导致农户违约。然而，基于加纳农村地区一项随机田野实验的数据，我们对这一假设的合理性展开了验证；具体而言，我们通过实证分析探究了与农户违约相关的各类影响因素。我们的初步研究结果显示，违约率与作物产量变化的相关性更为显著，而非作物价格。此外，我们的分析还表明，贷款发放所处的社会情境或许对农户是否违约有着重要影响。尽管我们无法确定上述各类因素间的因果关系，但我们认为这些关联具备较强的研究价值，值得在后续的田野实验中开展进一步探究。