Is there a place for what isn’t fair? A proposal for the justification of moral judgements

Abstract The purpose of this essay is to reflect on the problem of moral justification and its relation to the idea of justice. It is argued that, as a predicate of moral judgments, the idea of justice involves two ethical requirements articulated among themselves: the first indicates the aspiration to guarantee a non-arbitrary meaning for the norms that we ought to obey; the second reflects an emphasis on the doubly consensual character and universalizability of these norms. Finally, it is concluded that the challenge of reciprocal consent, a condition for normative consensus, is linked to a constructive sense of morality, around which the notion of justice can assume an equally pedagogical value for moral agents.

摘要
本研究旨在反思道德证成问题及其与正义理念的关联。文中指出，作为道德判断的谓词，正义理念蕴含两项彼此相互关联的伦理要求：其一旨在为我们应当服从的规范赋予非任意性意涵；其二则着重强调此类规范的双重合意性特征与可普遍化属性。最后研究得出结论：作为规范共识之必要条件的相互合意所面临的挑战，与建构主义道德观紧密相关；在此框架下，正义理念可对道德主体展现出同等的教化价值。