Replication Data for: Parliamentary Positions and Politicians’ Private Sector Earnings: Evidence from the UK House of Commons

Most democracies allow their Members of Parliament (MPs) to concurrently be employed in the private sector. A widespread worry is that politicians leverage their current or past posts within parliament, for example as ministers or committee chairs, to gain lucrative jobs. However, we know little about whether \"moonlighting\" income is indeed driven by these positions. I analyze comprehensive new panel data on the private sector earnings of all members of the UK House of Commons 2010--2016. Focusing on within-legislator variation, I find that currently holding an influential position does not cause an increase in income from outside jobs. Politicians do see higher earnings soon after leaving their parliamentary posts, but this effect is concentrated among cabinet ministers. The article advances the literature by identifying which political posts lead to financial benefits in the private sector -- and when.

多数民主国家允许本国议员（Members of Parliament，MPs）同时在私营部门任职。当前存在一项广为流传的担忧：政客会利用其现任或曾任的议会职务——例如部长或委员会主席之职——来谋取报酬丰厚的职位。然而，目前我们对‘兼职（moonlighting）’收入是否确实由这些议会职务所驱动却知之甚少。本研究分析了2010年至2016年间英国下议院全体议员私营部门收入的全新综合面板数据。通过聚焦议员个体层面的收入差异，本研究发现：现任具有影响力的议会职务并不会带来外部兼职收入的增长。政客们在卸任议会职务后不久确实会获得更高收入，但这一效应仅集中在内阁大臣群体中。本研究通过明确何种政治职务会为任职者带来私营部门的经济收益，以及该收益产生的具体时机，推动了相关领域的学术研究进展。