Replication Data for: International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements: A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union

Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.

各国常诉诸国际法院，以解决国际关系领域的集体行动难题。然而此类法院通常无法强制执行其作出的裁决，这便引出了一个核心议题：国际法院的效力究竟如何？本书提出了一套关于国际法院的一般性理论，该理论假定法院对主权国家政府不具备直接强制权力，成员国既可以自由无视该国际协定，也可无视为执行该协定所设立的法院作出的裁决。该理论证明，即便如此，国际法院仍可在重要的政治约束框架内，切实推动国际法框架下的国际合作。作者以欧盟为具体研究场景，对该理论论证展开验证。研究团队依托欧洲法院（European Court of Justice）裁决的原创数据集展开分析，结果发现，法院裁决的裁量倾向与成员国政府对裁决的遵从情况，均与该理论的预测结果相符。