Analysing the trade-off between transparency and efficiency in the Council of the European Union

This article analyses the oft-invoked tension between transparency and efficiency in the context of the Council of the European Union. It asks to what extent these two sources of legitimacy are incompatible, by exploring the premises and the coherence of the trade-off argument. It argues that the argument is unclear because of the multiple meanings of efficiency. Furthermore, while the trade-off is in some instances more plausible than in others, transparency does not necessarily threaten efficiency and can sometimes even increase it. The presumed correlation between secrecy and efficiency, on which the trade-off is implicitly based, can also be questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. For these reasons, the trade-off argument forms a generally contingent and often questionable basis for limiting transparency.

本文针对欧洲联盟理事会（Council of the European Union）语境下常被提及的透明度与效率间的张力展开分析。本文通过探讨权衡论证的前提与内在一致性，探究这两大合法性来源在多大程度上不可兼容。本文指出，由于“效率”一词存在多重内涵，该权衡论证本身表述模糊。此外，尽管权衡逻辑在部分场景下较其他场景更具说服力，但透明度未必会损害效率，有时甚至能提升效率。该权衡论证暗中依托的“保密与效率间的推定关联”，同样可从理论与实证层面受到质疑。基于上述原因，该权衡论证通常仅具备偶然性，且往往难以作为限制透明度的合理依据。