Constraining the Samurai: Rebellion and Taxation in Early Modern Japan

On the eve of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the nearly 300 semi-autonomous domains across Japan had widely varying tax rates. Some handed over 70 percent of their rice yield to the samurai ruler of the domain, while others provided 15 percent. This variation existed in spite of the similar fiscal demands that the domain rulers faced within the Tokugawa regime—the feudal system that governed Japan between 1603 and 1868. This period was remarkably stable; Japan saw no foreign or domestic wars. This allows us to focus on the impact of pressure from below on taxation. We study the extent to which peasant-led rebellions and collective desertion (“flight”) lowered the subsequent tax rate imposed by samurai rulers. Using newly compiled data on different types of peasant-led political mobilization—from petitions to insurrections—we find an association between, on the one hand, large-scale rebellions and flight and, on the other, lower tax rates. We interpret the results as evidence of rebellious or mobile peasants’ ability to constrain their rulers; the more complacent fail to win concessions. Our findings suggest that peasant mobilization played a role in restricting state growth in early modern Japan through tax concessions.

1868年明治维新（Meiji Restoration）前夕，日本全国近300个半自治藩国的税率差异悬殊。部分藩国需将七成稻米产量上缴给藩武士统治者，另有部分仅上缴15%。尽管在1603至1868年统治日本的封建制度——德川政权（Tokugawa regime）框架下，各藩统治者面临的财政需求大体相近，但税率差异依然存在。该时期整体局势极为稳定，日本未发生任何对外或对内战争，这使得我们得以专注探究底层压力对税收政策的影响。本研究旨在量化农民主导的叛乱与集体逃亡（"flight"）对武士统治者后续所定税率的抑制程度。我们依托新汇编的、涵盖从请愿到起义等各类农民主导政治动员行为的数据，发现大规模叛乱与逃散行为，与更低的税率之间存在显著关联。我们将上述结果解读为：反抗或流动的农民具备约束统治者的能力，而愈发懈怠的统治者则无法争取到民众让步。本研究结果表明，农民动员通过推动税收减免，在早期现代日本（early modern Japan）的国家扩张限制进程中发挥了作用。