Data_Sheet_2_Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?.PDF

IntroductionThe human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a ‘fictive pass’ that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character’s behaviour.
MethodsWe use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.
Results and discussionWe show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with (‘transported’ by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a ‘fictive pass’ to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character’s moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task).

引言：人类能够沉浸于虚构世界的能力，引出了一系列关于其背后运作机制的重要心理学议题。其中尤为值得关注的是，相较于纪实内容，人们在沉浸程度、对涉事角色及其行为的看法等维度，是否会对虚构故事产生差异化反应。已有研究提出，虚构作品为我们提供了一种「虚构豁免权（fictive pass）」，使我们能够以更为平衡、超脱的视角评判角色行为的道德性。
方法：本研究采用随机对照实验设计对上述假设开展验证。
结果与讨论：本研究结果显示，尽管知晓某一较长电影片段属于纪实还是虚构内容，并不会影响观察者对一则令人不安的故事的投入程度（即「沉浸感（transported）」），但虚构属性确实赋予了观察者「虚构豁免权」，使其能够对道德越轨者产生共情。然而，虚构豁免权并不会削弱个体评判角色道德越轨行为成因的能力（至少在因果归因任务的测量指标下如此）。