Network as information: endogenous network in coordination game

We investigate the concept of endogenous information leadership within the financial market. Prior to coordinating their investments, investors establish a star network at a certain cost. The central node of this star network functions as an information leader, collecting and sharing information with all network members, thereby enhancing the chances of successful coordination. We delve deeper into the process of selecting the information leader by introducing a name market, inspired by Tadelis (1999), to identify individuals with the highest leadership potential to assume this role. The interplay between leadership selection through the name market and successful coordination creates a reinforcing loop. The emergence of contagion is attributed to leadership dynamics. Furthermore, we identify an equilibrium where leadership alternates. Our findings provide new insights into the regulation of social media platforms.

本研究探讨金融市场中的内生性信息领导力（endogenous information leadership）概念。投资者在协调投资策略前，会以一定成本搭建星型网络（star network）。该星型网络的中心节点将扮演信息领导者的角色，收集并向所有网络成员共享信息，从而提升投资协调成功的概率。受Tadelis（1999）的研究启发，本研究通过引入命名市场（name market）来深入剖析信息领导者的遴选流程，以甄别出具备最高领导力潜质的个体出任该职务。通过命名市场开展的领导力遴选与投资协调成功之间的互动，会形成正向强化循环。金融传染效应（contagion）的产生可归因于领导力动态演化机制。此外，本研究还识别出一种领导力交替更迭的均衡状态。本研究结论为社交媒体平台的监管工作提供了全新的理论洞见。