Replication Data for: Do States Constrain Non-State Hackers?: International Telecommunication Union Elections and Non-State Cyber Aggression

Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory. Replication data for article forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution.

各国是否会约束非国家黑客？本文拓展了国际关系领域关于跨国网络攻击作用的相关研究，证明各国政府存在遏制非国家黑客行为的激励动因。为验证这一论点，本文依托国际电信联盟（International Telecommunication Union, ITU）的竞争性选举设置：该类选举要求各国以本国网络安全实绩作为竞选纲领。通过利用这一制度场景带来的变量差异，本文证实各国会对激励做出响应——参选国家会减少非国家网络攻击行为，以提升自身当选概率。这一研究发现表明，国际机构可作为跨国网络攻击问题的政策解决方案，具备可观应用潜力；同时也证实结构性激励能够促使各国约束本国境内活动的黑客群体。本文即将发表于《冲突解决期刊》（Journal of Conflict Resolution），其复现数据集已公开。