Benchmark regression.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.在实行分权制衡的现代企业中，终极控制人（ultimate controller）能够有效影响企业战略的实施与运营管理效率，同时可通过监督与约束企业内部的管理层堑壕效应（management entrenchment effect）完善公司治理。本研究基于企业年报披露的终极控制人相关信息，以2007至2020年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验了终极控制人缺位对企业投资效率的影响。研究结果表明，无终极控制人企业的投资效率相对低于存在终极控制人的企业，具体表现为该类企业存在投资不足问题。进一步分析显示，当企业所处的金融环境、内部治理环境与外部治理环境越差时，这一效应越显著。机制检验发现，终极控制人缺位会加剧企业内部的代理问题，推高融资约束程度，进而引发投资不足，降低企业投资效率。经济后果检验还证实，终极控制人缺位引发的非效率投资会损害企业未来价值，但会提升管理层薪酬。综上，本研究表明，终极控制人是企业内部治理的重要组成部分，尤其在监督管理层行为与化解代理冲突方面发挥着关键作用。