Games as frames

We show that economic games per se can provide contextual cues and thereby impact behavior. In two laboratory experiments, we examine whether deliberating on trust games versus stag-hunt games without feedback changes cooperation behavior in a subsequent game. First, we find that subjects who play trust games without feedback hold more pessimistic beliefs about other players’ cooperation in a subsequent game than subjects who played stag-hunt games without feedback. We also observe that deliberation on trust games versus stag-hunt games accordingly affects behavior in a subsequent, unrelated game. While stag-hunt games align interests between players, trust games pose a conflict of interest between players. Such (mis-)alignments induced by the game potentially explain our findings, because they may offer cues that affect beliefs and behavior in subsequent games.本研究表明，经济博弈（economic games）本身即可提供情境线索，进而对个体行为产生影响。本研究依托两项实验室实验，探究在无反馈条件下，参与信任博弈（trust games）与猎鹿博弈（stag-hunt games）的经历，是否会改变后续博弈中的合作行为。结果显示：其一，相较于参与过无反馈猎鹿博弈的被试，参与过无反馈信任博弈的被试，对后续博弈中其他参与者的合作水平持有更为悲观的预判。其二，参与信任博弈与猎鹿博弈的体验，也会相应地影响后续无关博弈中的个体行为。猎鹿博弈能够协调参与者间的利益，而信任博弈则会引发参与者之间的利益冲突。博弈所诱发的这类（非）利益协调效应，或可解释本研究的发现——这类效应可能提供了影响后续博弈中信念与行为的情境线索。