Regression results after replacing variables.

The succession mode of interim CEO is highly uncertain. The smooth transition function of interim CEO is particularly important in the process of enterprise reform. We divide interim CEOs into potential successors and transition successors. Then we empirically analyze the heterogeneous impact and mechanism of interim CEOs on firm performance. The results show that compared with transition CEO, potential CEO has less negative impact on corporate performance. Interim CEO has a negative impact on enterprise performance by reducing agency efficiency. The mechanism analysis of this paper are as follows. For the potential CEO, strong incentive constraints can effectively mitigate the negative impact of the succession on corporate performance. For a transitional CEO, superior personal capabilities coupled with an effective oversight mechanism represent more optimal solutions. In today’s corporate landscape, the frequencies of executive changes and interim successions are on the rise annually. Our research is tailored to aid enterprises in navigating these transitions seamlessly and in expediting their recovery processes.

临时首席执行官（interim CEO）的继任模式具有高度不确定性。其平稳过渡职能在企业改革进程中尤为关键。我们将临时首席执行官划分为潜在继任者与过渡继任者两类。随后我们实证分析了临时首席执行官对企业绩效的异质性影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示，相较于过渡型首席执行官，潜在型首席执行官对企业绩效的负面影响更为微弱。临时首席执行官会通过降低代理效率对企业绩效产生负面影响。本文的机制分析如下：对于潜在型首席执行官而言，强有力的激励约束能够有效缓解继任行为对企业绩效带来的负面影响；对于过渡型首席执行官，凭借其卓越的个人能力搭配有效的监督机制则是更为优化的解决方案。在当前的企业环境中，高管变更与临时继任事件的发生频率正逐年攀升。本研究旨在助力企业平稳应对此类继任过渡，并加速其复苏进程。