Partisan alignment and requests for federal transfers in Brazil

Abstract This article analyzes how subnational governments request transfers from the federal government in Brazil. Using microdata on applications for discretionary transfers from the Brazilian federal government to municipalities between 2009 and 2016 and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), I show that mayors affiliated with the president’s party demand substantially more resources than opposition mayors, meaning that the partisan alignment is an important channel to request transfers. On the other hand, the effect varies among mayors from other coalition parties. Thus, the results show that partisan alignment between different levels of government is a key factor in explaining the requests for discretionary resources in Brazil.

摘要：本文探讨巴西次国家级政府向联邦政府申请转移支付的行为逻辑。研究采用2009至2016年巴西联邦政府向各市政当局拨付自由裁量转移支付（discretionary transfers）的申请微观数据，结合断点回归设计（Regression Discontinuity Design，RDD）开展实证分析。结果显示，隶属于总统所在政党的市长，其申请获得的转移支付资源规模显著高于反对党市长，表明党派契合是影响转移支付申请的重要渠道。另一方面，该效应在其他联合政党的市长群体中存在异质性差异。综上，不同层级政府间的党派契合，是解释巴西自由裁量类资源申请行为的关键影响因素。