Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible
收藏DataONE2020-11-30 更新2024-06-08 收录
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As humans, we think not only about what is, but also what could be. These representations of alternative possibilities support many important cognitive functions, such as predicting others’ future actions, assigning responsibility for past events, and making moral judgments. We perform many of these tasks quickly and effortlessly, which suggests access to an implicit, default assumption about what is possible. What are the default features of the possibilities that we consider? Remarkably, we find a default bias toward representing immoral or irrational actions as being impossible. Although this bias is diminished upon deliberative reflection, it is the default judgments that appear to support higher-level cognition.
作为人类,我们不仅会思考现实存在的事物,亦会思索本可能存在的种种情境。这类对替代可能性的表征支撑着诸多关键认知功能,例如预测他人的未来行为、为过往事件归因以及做出道德判断。我们能快速且毫不费力地完成其中诸多任务,这表明我们拥有一套关于可能性的内隐默认假设。我们所考量的可能性,其默认特征究竟为何?值得注意的是,我们发现存在一种默认偏向:将不道德或非理性的行为表征为不可能发生之事。尽管经过审慎思考后,这种偏向会有所减弱,但恰恰是这类默认判断,支撑了更高阶的认知活动。
创建时间:
2023-11-23



