Replication Data for: The fiscal benefits of repeated cooperation: coalitions and debt dynamics in 36 democracies

Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons in fiscal policy-making, as posited by standard political economy models? This article focuses on coalitions which have created high levels of familiarity through shared governing experience in the past and which are likely to cooperate again in future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have incentives to internalize the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreements to balance their constituencies’ fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broad coalitions should have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thus resulting with lower debt increases compared not only to less durable coalitions, but also to single-party governments. Comparing 36 OECD/EU democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I estimate the effects of coalitions’ cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporal coordination problems and to reach specific policy goals.

正如标准政治经济学模型所提出的假设，联合政府在财政政策制定中真的会面临短期视野的局限吗？本文聚焦于那些凭借既往共同执政经历形成高度共事默契、且未来有望再度组成执政联盟的联合政府。本文认为，此类联合政府有动机将债务积累的未来成本内部化，并达成可信协议以平衡其各选区的财政诉求。此外，维持广泛联合政府的做法在推进颇具争议的经济改革时具备选举优势，因此其债务增幅不仅低于存续期更短的联合政府，也低于单一政党政府。本文对1962年至2013年的36个经合组织（OECD）与欧盟（EU）民主国家开展对比分析，估算了联合政府的合作前景对公共债务动态变化的影响。研究结果表明，长期视野能够帮助联合政府克服跨期协调难题，并达成特定的政策目标。