Follow the leader: the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the EU's rule of law revolution

The autocratization of Hungary and Poland prompted a revolution in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)'s caselaw. Brick by brick, the ECJ imposed novel obligations on EU member states to safeguard the rule of law while expanding the legal bases for the EU to sanction governments breaching the Union's fundamental values. In this article, we ask whether the ECJ pioneered this rule of law revolution or, conversely, whether the Court responded to an entrepreneurial European Commission acting as ‘guardian of the Treaties’. While supranationalist theories depict the Commission as a proactive agenda-setter guiding the Court's innovations, studies of the EU's rule of law crisis argue that the Commission dragged its feet or only recently seized the reins of leadership. Which perspective is closer to the mark? Deploying a new theoretical framework to study judicial innovation and agenda-setting on an original dataset of all rule of law cases adjudicated by the ECJ from 2010 through 2023, we demonstrate that the Commission has been an inconsistent and often indifferent agenda-setter. Besides several proactive interventions limited to the latter years of the Juncker Commission, the Court's innovative rulings prompted the Commission to act more than the reverse, belying a fundamental shift in leadership.

匈牙利与波兰的威权化进程，推动了欧洲法院（European Court of Justice, ECJ）判例法的变革。欧洲法院循序渐进地为欧盟成员国设定了维护法治的全新义务，同时拓展了欧盟制裁违反联盟核心价值成员国政府的法律依据。本文旨在探讨：究竟是欧洲法院率先开启了这场法治变革，抑或是该法院回应了以‘条约守护者’自居、锐意进取的欧盟委员会（European Commission）的行动？尽管超国家主义理论将欧盟委员会描绘为引导法院推进司法创新的积极议程设定者，但针对欧盟法治危机的相关研究却认为，欧盟委员会要么拖延推诿，直至近期才掌握领导主动权。哪种观点更贴合实际？本文依托2010年至2023年间欧洲法院审理的全部法治案件的原始数据集，运用全新的理论框架开展司法创新与议程设定研究，结果表明欧盟委员会始终是一个立场摇摆不定、且往往消极被动的议程设定者。除容克任主席的欧盟委员会执政后期的数次主动干预外，欧洲法院的创新性判决促使欧盟委员会采取行动的情形，远多于欧盟委员会推动法院行动的情况，这与所谓领导权发生根本转变的论调相悖。