Data and code for: "Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools." by Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin.
收藏ICPSR2021-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/121941/version/V1/view
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资源简介：
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a ‘pay-for-percentile’ or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
提供机构：
McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University; School of International Development, University of East Anglia; Williams College; Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
创建时间：
2021-01-01
