Replication Data for: Party Elite Engagement and Coordination in House Primary Elections: A Test of Theories of Parties

The support of party elites in the primary has a strong influence on who runs in a primary and how well they do. Yet party elites do not always engage or coordinate their efforts. Moreover, theories of parties disagree about whether and where party elites should engage and coordinate in primaries depending on their view of the relative importance of electoral and policy goals. This paper examines party elite engagement and coordination in primary elections for the U.S. House between 2004 and 2018. Consistent with theories of parties as networks of policy demanders, party elites are engaged in primaries in competitive and safe districts. In addition, while party elites coordinate their efforts in competitive districts, they are less likely to coordinate in safe districts. While parties are involved in primaries in both safe and competitive districts, their disparate coordination efforts reflect different electoral priorities in these districts.

政党精英在初选中的支持，对参与初选的候选人选择及其竞选表现具有显著影响。然而，政党精英并非始终会参与初选活动或协调彼此行动。此外，不同政党理论对于政党精英应在初选中何时、何地参与活动并协调行动的议题存在分歧，这种分歧源于各理论对选举目标与政策目标相对重要性的判断差异。本研究针对2004年至2018年间美国众议院（U.S. House）的初选展开分析，考察政党精英的参与及协调行为。研究结果契合“将政党视作政策需求者网络”的政党理论：政党精英会在竞争性选区与安全选区的初选中均参与活动。此外，尽管政党精英会在竞争性选区的初选中协调行动，但在安全选区中，其实施协调行为的概率相对更低。尽管政党在安全选区与竞争性选区的初选中均有参与，但其差异化的协调举措实则反映了两类选区各自不同的选举优先事项。