How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups

What are the most efficient strategies to prevent military coups d’état? The answer depends on coup agency, that is, who attempts to overthrow the regime: elite officers or lower-ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower-ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities when it comes to perpetrating coups. Using original data on coup agency, public spending, and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find that counterbalancing—a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters’ coordination efforts—and higher shares of defense spending prove more effective at preventing coups by elite officers. However, higher social spending reduces the risk of coups by combat officers. Political liberalization has mixed effects on military agents. It decreases the risk of coups by combat officers, but makes elite officers more likely to mount coups. Our findings suggest that the study of coups needs to better incorporate variation and that we need to rethink the image of coups as purely elite-led power grabs.

防范军事政变的最优策略为何？答案取决于政变发起主体（coup agency）——即试图推翻政权的行动者类型：精英军官，抑或是低阶作战军官。精英军官与低阶作战军官在发动政变时，其动机、机遇与行动能力均存在显著差异。本研究依托中东与北非地区有关政变发起主体、公共支出及军官薪酬的原始数据，得出以下结论：旨在提升政变策划者协调门槛的制衡策略（counterbalancing），以及更高占比的国防开支，可更有效地防范精英军官发动的政变。但更高的社会支出则会降低作战军官发动政变的风险。政治自由化对军事行动主体的影响存在分化：其可降低作战军官发动政变的风险，却会提升精英军官发动政变的可能性。本研究结果表明，政变研究需更好地纳入异质性分析维度，同时我们也应重新审视‘政变纯属精英主导的权力攫取行为’这一固有认知。