Replication Data for: Democracy by Deterrence: Norms, Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting

In contemporary democracies, backsliding typically occurs through legal machinations. Self-enforcing democracy requires that political parties refrain from exploiting legal opportunities to tilt electoral rules. Using a formal model, we argue that informal norms of mutual forbearance and formal constitutional rules are fundamentally intertwined via a logic of deterrence. By circumscribing how far each party can legally bend the rules, legal bounds create reversion points if mutual forbearance collapses. If legal bounds are symmetric between parties, they deter electoral tilting by making credible each party's threat to punish transgressions by the other. If legal bounds become sufficiently asymmetric, however, the foundations for forbearance crumble. Asymmetries emerge when some groups (a) are more vulnerable than others to legally permissible electoral distortions and (b) favored and disfavored groups sort heavily into parties. We apply this mechanism to explain gerrymandering and voting rights in the United States in the post-Civil Rights era.

在当代民主政体中，民主倒退（democratic backsliding）通常依托合法的策略性操作得以实现。自我维系型民主（self-enforcing democracy）要求各政党不得利用合法契机扭曲选举规则。本研究通过形式化模型（formal model）论证：相互克制的非正式规范与正式宪法规则，本质上通过威慑（deterrence）逻辑深度交织。通过限定各政党在法律框架内可调整规则的边界，法律边界可在相互克制失效时设立逆转基准点（reversion points）。若各政党间的法律边界对称，则双方均可可信地发出惩罚对方违规行为的威胁，以此遏制选举规则扭曲（electoral tilting）行为。但若法律边界出现足够显著的不对称性，相互克制的基础便会土崩瓦解。当出现以下两类情况时，不对称性便会产生：其一，部分群体相较于其他群体，更易受到合法范围内选举扭曲行为的影响；其二，受青睐群体与受打压群体高度集中于特定政党。本研究将该机制应用于解释后民权时代（post-Civil Rights era）美国的杰利蝾螈（gerrymandering）与投票权问题。