The Policy Adjacent: How Affordable Housing Generates Policy Feedback Among Neighboring Residents

While scholars have documented feedback effects among a policy's direct winners and losers, less is known about whether such effects can occur among the indirectly affected — ''the policy adjacent.'' Using 458 geocoded housing developments built between two nearly identical statewide ballot propositions funding affordable housing in California, we show that policy generates feedback effects among neighboring residents in systematic ways. New, nearby affordable housing causes majority-homeowner blocks to increase their support for the housing bond, while majority-renter blocks decrease or do not change their support. We attribute the positive effect among majority-homeowner blocks to the housing's replacement of blight. In contrast, the lack of a positive effect among majority-renter blocks may be driven by the threat of gentrification. Policy implementation can win support for expansion among unexpected beneficiaries, while failing to do so even among the policy's presumed allies.

尽管学者们已证实某项政策的直接获益者与直接受损者之间存在反馈效应，但学界对于这类效应是否会出现在间接受影响群体——即“政策关联群体（policy adjacent）”——中，仍知之甚少。本研究选取加州两项内容近乎一致的全州保障性住房资助投票提案实施周期内建成的458个地理编码住宅开发项目作为样本，证实政策会以系统性方式在邻近居民群体中引发反馈效应：周边新建的保障性住房会使以房主为多数的街区提升对该住房债券提案的支持率，而以租客为多数的街区则会降低支持率，或维持原有支持度不变。我们将以房主为多数的街区出现的正向反馈效应，归因于保障性住房取代了该区域的破败区域。与之相反，以租客为多数的街区未出现正向反馈效应，其驱动因素可能是居民面临的绅士化威胁。政策实施能够在意外获益群体中为政策扩张争取到支持，却甚至无法获得该政策预设盟友群体的支持。