Trust-game interactions and beliefs in continuous and "All-or-Nothing" investment action spaces.

In Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, & Shields (2020) we conduct two between-subjects experiments to focus our research on “All-or-Nothing” options featured in many trust-based economic interactions. A fundamental issue with restricted investment action spaces is that their imposition may unintentionally affect reciprocity. Drawing from a student sample, we presented participants with an anonymous trust game. In these trust games we manipulate the investor’s action space. In the All-or-Nothing version investors can invest either “all” their endowment or “nothing”. In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. In both versions, the experimenter multiplies the invested amount by three - creating potential gains from trust. Then the trustee receives this and decides how much to reciprocate to the investor. In a second experiment with another student sample we manipulate our description of the “trust game” (i.e. describing either the All-or-Nothing or Continuous version) to investigate effects on beliefs about investor trust and expectations about trustee reciprocity. This data is organized in two files, one for Experiment 1 and one for Experiment 2 described above. Each of these files has (1) a tab with the participants’ economic behavior in the experiment, and (2) a tab with a codebook explaining participants’ data.

在Gómez-Miñambres、Schniter与Shields（2020）的研究中，我们开展了两项被试间实验（between-subjects experiments），旨在聚焦诸多基于信任的经济互动中常见的全有或全无（All-or-Nothing）选项。受限投资行动空间存在一项核心问题：其设置可能会无意中影响互惠行为。我们以学生群体为被试样本，向其呈现匿名信任博弈（trust game）。在该类博弈中，我们对投资者的行动空间进行操纵：在全有或全无版本中，投资者仅可选择投资其全部禀赋（endowment）或完全不投资；而在另一连续投资版本中，投资者可选择投资任意数额的禀赋。两种实验设置下，实验者均会将投资金额乘以三倍，以此创造由信任带来的潜在收益。随后受托人将获得该笔资金，并自主决定向投资者返还多少金额以实现互惠。在第二项针对另一组学生被试的实验中，我们通过操纵信任博弈的描述框架（即分别采用全有或全无版本或连续投资版本的表述），探究其对投资者信任信念以及受托人互惠预期的影响。本数据集共包含两个文件，分别对应上述的实验1与实验2。每个文件均包含两个工作表：其一收录了被试在实验中的经济行为数据，其二则附带编码手册（codebook），用于解释被试的各项数据。