<p>Local Stability of the Equilibrium Point.</p>

This study addresses the prevalent issues of “coordination failure” and “cooperative inertia” in the collaborative education of mental health between universities and society. Utilizing evolutionary game theory, it systematically constructs and analyzes four models that combine government rewards and punishments. The findings indicate that while the traditional static reward and punishment mechanism offers basic incentives, its rigid design results in the system’s path dependence on government subsidies, thereby hindering the development of sustainable endogenous motivation. In order to address this governance dilemma, this paper first put forward the idea of combining “performance-based grant-reputation incentive” linkage system, this mechanism has prompted the external incentives to the internal incentives transformation effect under the joint governance of short-term fiscal policy and long-term reputation asset through the dynamic adjustment of incentive coefficient and reputation incentive resources are put into use. Numerical simulation results show that the “dynamic reward - static punishment” hybrid model of the two has the best policy effect. In the initial stage of cooperative relationship, government funding helps to break the situation of cooperation cannot be broken; In the later stage of the cooperation, the pursuit of reputation capital has become the motive for cooperating in deeper. It can be learned from relevant studies that reasonably allocating more incentive resources to universities that take the initiative can significantly enhance the efficiency of the system evolving into the state of deep cooperation and open sharing. Both theoretical and empirical evidence confirms that the proposed dynamic linkage mechanism markedly outperforms the traditional static model in terms of policy adaptability, incentive sustainability, and institutional robustness. This finding not only enriches the understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of the psychological healthy education system but also provides a theoretical foundation and practical pathway for establishing an incentivized, compatible, and sustainable governance system for mental health education.本研究针对高校与社会开展心理健康协同教育过程中普遍存在的“协调失灵”与“合作惰性”问题，运用演化博弈论，系统构建并分析了四种结合政府奖惩的模型。研究结果显示，传统静态奖惩机制虽可提供基础激励，但其刚性设计会导致系统对政府补贴形成路径依赖，进而阻碍可持续内生动力的培育。为破解这一治理困境，本文首次提出构建“绩效拨款-声誉激励”联动体系的构想：该机制通过动态调整激励系数并投入声誉激励资源，在短期财政政策与长期声誉资产的协同治理下，实现外部激励向内部激励的转化效应。数值仿真结果表明，二者结合的“动态奖励-静态惩罚”混合模型政策效果最优。在合作关系初期，政府资助有助于打破合作僵局；在合作后期，对声誉资本的追求已成为深化合作的核心动因。相关研究表明，向主动参与的高校合理倾斜更多激励资源，可显著提升系统演化至深度合作与开放共享状态的效率。理论与实证证据均证实，所提出的动态联动机制在政策适配性、激励可持续性与制度稳健性方面，均显著优于传统静态模型。这一发现不仅丰富了对心理健康教育系统演化动态的认知，还为构建激励相容、可持续的心理健康教育治理体系提供了理论基础与实践路径。