The Elusive Quest for Disarmed Peace: Contest Games and International Relations
收藏NBER2023-06-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w31343
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资源简介:
This paper extends the canonical security competition one-shot game by developing a dynamic framework where states can invest in a technology to eliminate their rival. The model includes a settlement stage for negotiation, stochastic contestable resources, and it assumes diplomacy never failsso
本文通过构建动态分析框架,拓展了经典安全竞争单次博弈模型,该框架允许各国通过投资某项技术以消除其竞争对手。本模型涵盖谈判协商阶段、随机可争夺资源,并假设外交绝不会失效。
提供机构:
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间:
2023-06-01



