Replication Data for: Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict

Since 9/11, several states initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives, and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (such as resource rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a ‘weak state.’ This allows rivals to seize portions of the government’s territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post-Cold war African dyads from 1990-2006.自9·11事件以来，已有多个国家以打击恐怖主义为名发起军事冲突。然而多项研究表明，相较于战争所造成的破坏，恐怖主义所带来的代价可谓微不足道。这便引出了一个核心问题：既然恐怖主义所构成的风险看似微乎其微，为何各国仍会发起代价高昂的战争？本研究提出了两种解释路径。其一，我们认为，尽管恐怖组织往往无法达成其战略目标，但却能够实现战术层面的目的，甚至可能通过占领局部领土，逐步演变为叛乱势力。对此，各国可能会发起预防性战争，以阻止恐怖组织巩固对具有战略价值领土（例如资源富集地区）的控制权。其二，敌对国家可能会借机利用恐怖主义暴力事件，宣称目标国为‘弱势国家’，从而得以打着反恐的旗号，侵占该国的部分领土。我们采用1990年至2006年冷战后非洲国家双边数据集对上述假说进行了实证检验。